#OpSyria: Web censorship technologies in Syria revealed [EN]
This translated article is intended to update an international audience about the current situation concerning the OpSyria operation. All contents on this website are released under a Creative Commons By licence, you are free to reproduce, republish and broadcast this content as long as you provide a link to the original.
Today, Telecomix, Reflets.info & Fhimt.com have carefully looked into the infrastructure of the Internet censorship technologies used by the syrian regime. We discovered some quite surprising things. In a forthcoming series of articles, we will be highlighting the mechanisms used by the syrian regime to block websites and break secure connections on social networks in order to exercise closer control over the population, all with the help of an american firm: BlueCoat.
Guided by our friends from Telecomix, we have scanned Syria. Therefore, we are priviledged enough to act as digital observers in a country where all media have been banned. To this end, it seems legitimate that we share our holiday pics with all of you, and specifically with the people of Syria. fo0 and I [Bluetouff] set the tone a few months ago, when we did our very first digital tour throughout Bahrain. But this is different: nothing can compare to the Syrian regime, whose enormities are worthy of a Defcon’s blooper.
The informations we have found is freely available on the Internet:
critical communication an IT infrastructures, major local businesses, Internet access providers… No need to rush, there will be enough for everyone.
The very nature of the data we have found leaves no doubt concerning the architecture and the filtering technologies used by the Syrian regime. Our first impression was that Bashar al-Assad’s regime would have been well advised to have their IT experts trained in Ben Ali’s Tunisia. The Syrian internet army’s technical level is quite disastrous. On a national scale, Internet censorship is based on a solution which we will discuss further in the coming days. We’ve observed Bashar’s censorship system carefully – they’re outrageously intrusive and used for authoritarian purposes – and you can count on us, we will share our findings.
The evidence we have collected proves that there is a ban on secured authentications for communication tools, such as MSN, Yahoo Messenger, or the Facebook Chat. Syrian people who use these services should be aware that local authorities already stoled their passwords and that all their communications are being intercepted.
Together with Telecomix and Fhimt.com, Reflets.info is going to tell you in the coming days the fascinating story of a government censorship undermined by a bunch of hackers.
Stay tuned 
Written by @Bluetouff
Licence Creative Commons CC-by
This collaborative translation was made possible with the help of citizen from all around the world who took action and join OpSyria and helped
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It’s Reflets.info